On the linguistic side, we welcome submissions examining any grammatical phenomena sensitive to the degree of agency or interpretation of an action as intentional versus accidental, such as controller choice (Farkas 1988), subjunctive obviation (Ruwet 1991, Schlenker 2005, Costantini 2009, a.o.), licensing of polarity items (Szabolcsi 2004), aspect choice in Slavic (Forsyth 1970, Paducheva 2013, Despic 2020, a.o.), case marking in ergative split languages and ‘out-of-control’ morphology. The focus of the workshop is mainly empirical, so submissions are welcome from all domains of the grammar (morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, etc.) and irrespective of any specific theoretical framework. Some of the topics of interest include, but are not restricted to, the following:
- ways in which natural languages manifest different degrees of agency or the distinction between intentional and accidental actions (morphological marking, syntactic structures, semantic denotations of verbs and adverbials, pragmatic and contextual differences)
- connection between agency, intentions, and event structure
- relation between agency, intentions, and causality
On the side of philosophy, we welcome submissions addressing any aspect related to philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, the nature of agency, intentions, and acting intentionally. Both theoretical and empirical research contributing to debates on various theories of action, free will, moral responsibility, nature of reasons, and practical rationality are welcome.
Deadline: December 7, 2020.
Anonymous abstracts, not exceeding 2 pages (including references and examples), with font no less than 11 Times New Roman, and 2 cm margins, should be uploaded on AIL1 EasyChair site. We expect to notify authors of their acceptance at the end of December of 2020. Presentations will be allotted 30 minute slots with 15 minutes for questions and discussion.