Aim
• To account for why, in negative imperatives, like in (1a), the PPI indefinite, *somebody*, can take narrow scope under the clause-mate negation.

(1a. [How to avoid offending minority customers?]
Do not touch them. [...] Do not use profanity or racial slurs, and
*do not question somebody's immigration status*. (Coca)

b. Do *not inadventently* question *somebody*'s immigration status.

Key observation
• In such examples, the verbal predicate (e.g. *question somebody's immigration status*) denotes a non-responsible situation, which is confirmed in (1a) by the compatibility with the adverb *inadventently*, as in (1b).
Responsibility or intentionality?

Farkas’s (1988) definition of RESPONSIBILITY

\[ \text{RESP}(i, s) = \text{a relation holding between an individual } i \text{ and a situation } s \]

just in case \( i \text{ brings } s \text{ about } \text{INTENTIONALLY} \)

Goncharov (2018: 2)

i) Lexically non-intentional predicates: incompatible with the adverb intentionally

(2) #John resembles his father intentionally. (Farkas 1988: 39)

ii) Contextually non-intentional interpretation: modification by an adverbial, by accident

(3)a. Be careful! By accident, don’t open the window! (Goncharov 2018: 2)

b. Don’t inadvertently question somebody’s immigration status.

Goncharov (2020a: 14)

• RESP covers both intentionality of the initiation of action and control of the agent over it.
• Modification by an adverbial only target the initiation component.
• INTENTIONALITY crucially depends not on the initiation component, but the controlling component.
Goncharov (2020b: 2)

• The controlling component is tested by the availability of “weakness of will” reading.

(4)a. I don’t want to call May but I did. (OK weakness of will/accidentality reading)
b. I don’t want to offend Mary but I did. (*weakness of will/accidentality reading)

• According to this test, the predicate “question somebody’s immigration status” in (1) itself might be an intentional one, since it allows “weakness of will” reading.

(5) I didn’t want to question somebody’s immigration status but I did. (OK weakness of will/accidentality reading)

• The “weakness of will” test is surely useful to detect i) lexically non-intentional predicates, but not ii) contextually non-intentional interpretation of predicates.

• In this presentation, I refer to the modification test, which characterizes the situation type, rather than the “weakness of will” test, which serves to distinguish action type of each predicate.
Outline

§ 2: Goncharov’s (2018; 2020a,b) analyses of non-intentionality effect on
   i) negative imperatives and ii) licensing of PPIs

§ 3: Szabolcsi’s (2010) analysis of licensing of PPIs in terms of implicit exemption
   from obviation;
   Richardson’s (1985) analysis of negative imperatives in terms of coercion of a
   monitoring predicate

§ 4: Proposals

§ 5: Indirect evidences
   i) explicit and implicit exemption from obviation and licensing of PPIs in French
      purpose clause
   ii) Japanese auxiliary –TE SHIMAU, which is ambiguous between a completion
      meaning (with an intentional predicate) and ‘the realization of an
      unexpressed event’ reading (with a non-intentional predicate)
Negative imperatives in Slavic languages

- In Slavic languages, negative imperatives are incompatible with perfective aspect, as in (6a).
- This aspectual restriction “is lifted when the action expressed by the verb is interpreted as non-intentional” (Goncharov 2018: 1), as in (6b).

(6)a. Ne otkryvaj /*otlrjokno! [Russian]
     not open-IMPERF.IMP / open-PERF.IMP window
     ‘Don’t open the window!’

b. Ostorožno! Ne upadi! [Russian]
   careful not fall- PERF.IMP
   ‘Be careful! Don’t fall down!’ (Goncharov 2018: 2)
Intentional predicates are equipped with an Intentional operator (\textit{INT}), as in (3a).

The combination of the assertion in (3b), the scalar implicature in (3d), and the presupposition due to the Intentional operator in (3e), amounts to a contradiction, which isn’t the case with non-intentional predicates.

(7)a. Not \textit{INT} open-\textsc{perf} the window! (paraphrase of (2a))

b. Assertion: You must not end up opening the window.

c. Alternative: You must not start to open the window.

d. Scalar implicature: \neg(You must not start to open the window) = You may start to open the window.

e. Presupposition due to \textit{INT}: It must be the case that if you start to open the window, you end up opening it.

g. combination: You must not end up opening the window. [(7b)] & You may start to open the window. [(7d)] & It must be the case that if you start to open the window, you end up opening it. [(7e)]
A potential problem of Goncharov’s (2018) analysis?

- Presupposition due to \textsc{int} in (7e) reflects “the control component of intentionality [...] if an intentional action starts, it reaches the end point, i.e. the action is guided throughout the process and up to the point when the result is reached” (p.10)

- But, this presupposition does not seem to distinguish intentional action, like \textit{open the window} in (6a), and non-intentional actions, like \textit{fall down} in (6b), since if the situation ‘falling down’ starts, it also reached the end point in ordinary situations.

(8)a. Not fall down- \textsc{perf} ! (paraphrase of (2b))

b. Assertion: You must not end up falling down.

d. Scalar implicature: \neg\neg(You must not start to fall down) = You may start to fall down.

g. combination: You must not end up falling down. [(8b)] & You may start to fall down. [(8d)] \rightarrow pragmatically incoherent in ordinary situations?
• Goncharov (2020a,b) revisits Szabolcsi’s (2004) observation that PPI indefinites in the controlled complement of want may be out-scoped by the matrix negation when the complement predicate is non-intentional, as in (9b), unlike in cases with intentional predicates, as in (9a).

(9)a. I don’t want to call someone. [*not > someone] (Szabolcsi 2004: 417, fn 10)

b. I don’t want to offend someone. [\(\text{vnot} > \text{someone}\)] (ibid.)

• As mentioned above, according to Goncharov (2020a,b), INTENTIONALITY is defined as a characteristic of the predicate and depends not on the initiation component, but the controlling component.

• Why is the narrow scope reading of a PPI indefinite, someone, possible in (8b)?
• The complement denoting a non-intentional action induces a propositional operator **Luck**, as in (10a).

  i) **Luck** operator presupposes that, as in (10b), the referent of the matrix subject thinks that in some possible world near by the actual world, an event contrary to what she wants may happen (e.g. the event such that she offends someone, for (9b)), and;

  ii) PPIs are licensed in this presupposition part which is an upward-entailing context.

  iii) The desiderative verb, *want*, induces a conditional presupposition, as in (10c), which provides downward-entailing contexts which does not anti-license PPI indefinites.

(10)a. I want [**Luck** not [TP PRO to offend **someone**] (paraphrase of (8b))

  b. Presupposition due to **Luck**:

        ∃ w′ ∈ Near-by(Dox_{speaker,w}) [offend (someone) (speaker)(w′)]

  c. Presupposition of **Want**:

        ∃ w′ ∈ Dox_{sp,w}[offend(someone)(sp)(w′)] → ∃ w′ ∈ Dox_{sp,w} ¬ offend (someone)(sp)(w′)]
The analysis in terms of presupposition reminds Larrivée’s (2012) analysis: Larrivée (2012: 894)

With a contrast, the proposition including *some* is “presupposed or activated” and “treated as a whole, to which the [metalinguistic] negative applies to reject it entirely.” And “the latter does not have to interact directly with the PPI.”

(11)a. \( {\text{JOHN}}_{CT} \) didn’t say *something*. \( {\text{JANE}}_{CT} \) did. (Larrivée 2012: 883)
   b. It is **not** \( {\text{JOHN}} \) that said *something*, but it is \( {\text{JANE}} \).

**But**

Since *lucky* is induced with a non-intentional verb in matrix clauses, as in (12a). PPIs should be equally licensed in matrix clauses, as in (12b), which is not the case.

(12)a. \( \lambda w. \text{John won the lottery} \ (w) \) is defined only if (i.e. presupposes that)
   \[ \exists w' \in \text{Near-by}(\text{Dox}_{j,w}) \ [\neg \text{won-the-lottery}(j)(w')] \] (Goncharov 2020a: 16)
   b. “John didn’t offend someone.” should presuppose \( \exists w' \in \text{Near-by}(\text{Dox}_{j,w}) \ [\text{offend-someone}(j)(w')] \)
Further Problems

i) Goncharov (2018) and Goncharov (2020) advance essentially different accounts for non-intentionality effect on negative imperatives and on licensing of PPIs.

- It is not clear how her analyses apply to non-intentionality effect on PPI-licensing in negative imperatives, as in (1).

ii) It is not clear if her analysis of (5a-c) holds for licensing of a PPI in (13) whose matrix verb *try* does not seem to provide a conditional presupposition, as in (5c).

(13) Basically, I was trying *not* to be *somebody*'s bitch for 10 years. (Coca) [V*not > somebody]
Szabolcsi (2010): explicit exemption from obviation

• In Hungarian, as in (14), when the complement of volitional verbs expresses a non-RESP situation, the obviation constraint may be exempt, and a subjunctive complement becomes acceptable. (cf. Farkas 1992)

(14) Nem akarom, [hogy lelőjek valakit]. (Hungarian)

‘I do not want [that I (inadvertently) shoot someone].’ (Szabolcsi 2010: 7)

• In (14), the external negation *nem* (‘not’) naturally allows the narrow scope reading of *valakit* (‘someone’).
Szabolcsi (2010): implicit exemption from obviation

- A PPI indefinite, *someone*, in the English controlled infinitive complement of volitional verbs, equally takes narrow scope under the negation, when the complement denotes a non-RESP situation, as in (15a).

- Parallel to the Hungarian controlled subjunctive in (14), the English controlled infinitive in (14a) is implicitly reanalyzed, because of its non-RESP nature, as a subjunctive clause, as in (15b), where the PPI, *someone*, is appropriately licensed by a clause-external negation.

(15)a. I don’t want to offend someone. [\(\text{Vnot} > \text{someone}\)] (Szabolcsi 2010: 6)

b. I want for it not to be the case [that I offend someone]. (*ibid.*)
• In (16a), “not falling of the ladder is for the carpenter not an act in any useful sense of the word at all, but rather a state of affairs which he must try to maintain if he is going to accomplish whatever his positive intentions might be”.

• In other words, negative imperatives like (16a) do not convey prohibitions but “commands to monitor against the events denoted by the VPs” (idem. 247).

• This meaning is captured by means of coercion of a monitoring predicate, take care, as in (16b).

(16)a. Don’t fall off the ladder! (Richardson 1985: 247)

b. TAKE CARE not to fall off the ladder. (ibid.)
• The negative imperative in (17a) is semantically reanalyzed as (17b), the obviation constraint being implicitly exempt because of the non-responsibility nature of the situation.

• According to this hypothesis, Goncharov’s presupposition due to $\textsc{luck}$ operator is put into the at-issue content.

• PPIs and perfective aspect are appropriately licensed since the negation is clause-external.

(17)a. Do **not** question **somebody**'s immigration status. (=1)

b. Take care for it **not** to be the case [that you question **somebody**'s immigration status].

c. $[\lambda x. \text{TAKE CARE} [\neg \exists p \,[p = \lambda w' \,(\exists y. \text{you question } y\text{'s immigration status in } w')] \in \text{To-Do-List} (\text{you})]$
Furthermore, adopting Portner’s (2007) analysis of imperative as property-denoting, I propose to semantically represent (17b) by (17c), which amounts to saying that taking care for the relevant situation not to happen is a property for the hearer to put into her To-Do-List.

(17)b. Take care for it not to be the case [that you question somebody's immigration status].

c. \[\lambda x. x \text{ TAKE CARE } [\neg \exists p [p = \lambda w' (\exists y. \text{ you question } y's \text{ immigration status in } w')]] \in \text{To-Do-List(you)}\]

According to this hypothesis, coercion of the monitoring predicate \text{TAKE CARE} is motivated formally by avoiding type-mismatch between the property-denotation of the imperative, and the proposition-denotation of the subjunctive clause.

- cf. Grano’s (2015) analysis of non-controlled infinitive of \textit{intend}, as in “John intends for Bill to leave.” in terms of coercion of the cause predicate \text{BRING ABOUT}, or more intuitively by a need to specify the role of the hearer in her To-Do-List.

Grano’s (2018: 616) “COERCION FREE semantics for intention reports”

• A RESP relation is not occasionally coerced, as proposed by Grano (2015), but is inherently included in the semantics of intend.

• “intention reports that instantiate syntactic control, like [18a], have essentially the same status as intention reports that do not instantiate syntactic control, like [19a]. […] In both cases, John names […] the individual who bears the RESP-relation with \( p \) [=the complement proposition]. The only difference is that in [18a], in virtue of being a control sentence, John also names the participant associated with the subject position of break the window, whereas in [19a], Bill takes this place.”

(18)a. John intended to break the window. (Grano 2018: 616)
   b. John intended to BRING IT ABOUT THAT he break the window.

(19)a. John intended for Bill to break the window. (ibid.)
   b. John intended to BRING IT ABOUT THAT Bill break the window. (ibid.)
Alleged evidence for “COERCION FREE semantics for intention reports”

(20)a. John intended to resemble his father. (idem..624)
   b. John intended to BRING IT ABOUT THAT he resemble his father. (ibid.)

• In order to naturally interpret (20a), a causative predicate should be coerced to establish a RESP relation between John and his resemblance to his father. But if a controlled complement in (20a) denotes a property, no type-mismatch should occur, and we find no motivation to coerce the causative predicate.

• On the contrary, the semantics of (20b) is naturally obtained by the coercion free approach according which the verb intend always introduces the causative predicate by its lexical characteristics.

• However, if we assume, with Szabolcsi (2010), that a non-RESP nature of the complement serves to exempt obviation, and to make a controlled infinitive semantically equivalent to a subjunctive complement denoting a proposition, the coercion-based approach naturally makes sense of the semantics in (20b), and the example in (20a) no longer comes against this approach.
Furthermore, if we apply the coercion free approach to imperatives and adopt *proposition-denoting* approach, the semantics of (21a) boils down to (21b) including a coerced predicate, just as a third person imperative (22a) represented by (22b).

(21)a. Get up!
   b. You should *bring it about* that you get up.

(22)a. Those children of yours keep out of my garden, or I’ll set the dog on them! (Potsdam 1998: 208)
   b. You should *bring it about* that those children of yours keep out of my garden.

But such a parallel treatment obscures a marked status of third person imperatives.

Kaufmann (2012: 122) effectively puts into question Potsdam’s (1998: 209) view according to which the referent of an imperative subject “is not restricted to being a subset of the addressee”, and suggests to analyze English examples as (22a) as a subjunctive clause, concluding that “imperative subjects are restricted to refer to […] a (sub)set containing the addressee(s)”. 
Why is the negation externalized in (17c,d)?

(17)c. Take care for it not to be the case [that you you question somone’s immigration status].

   d. \([\lambda x. x \text{ TAKE CARE } [\neg \exists p [p = \lambda w' (\exists y. \text{you question y’s immigration status in } w')]]] \in \text{To-Do-List(you)}\]

A speculative hypothesis
- The motivation of the externalization of the negation is due to a need to avoid a semantic incongruity of wide scope of the non-intentionality over the negation.
- Cf. a contrast between (23a) (where the adverb instantiating non-intentionality, *inadvertently*, takes wide scope) and (23b) (where it takes narrow scope).

(23)a. ??Inadvertently, I offend no one.
   b. There is no one I advertently offend.
Explicit and implicit obviation in French purpose clauses

(24)a. [...] j'avais étudié d'avance [the role] pour que je fusse capable de le soustraire, de ne recueillir comme résidu que le talent de Mme Berma.” (Proust)

‘I had studied in advance [the role] so that I be able to subtract it [...].”

b. [...] je maîtrise suffisamment mes sorts de glaces [of a video-game] pour ne pas que je blesse quelqu'un par inadvertance !!

‘[...] I sufficiently control my ice trails [of a video-game] in order not that I inadvertently hurt someone.’

https://www.wattpad.com/314558460-la-mage-blanche-de-blue-p%C3%A9gasus-et-le-trio-de

(25) [...] comme la salle était très grande et il y avait beaucoup d’hommes, pour ne pas déranger quelqu’un [= pour ne pas que je dérange quelqu’un], je suis parti m’asseoir sur les derniers bancs [...]

‘[...] as the hall was very large and there were a lot of people, in order not to disturb someone,
I left to sit down on the benches in the last row’.

(http://centremissionnairelavie.over-blog.org/2013/10/centre-missionnaire-la-vie-ap22/1-5-2.html)
• My hypothesis in terms of implicit exemption from obviation allows to deal with these two cases in a parallel fashion.

• Purpose clause may be analyzed in a similar way to the complement of *want and intend*.

Sæbø (2012: 1433)

• The question in (26) may be answered by a causal clause in (26a) as well as by a purpose clause in (26b).

• “q in order that p” is equated with “q because the agent wants that p”

(26) Why did he run?
   a. He ran *because he wanted to catch the train*. (Sæbø 2012: 1433)
   b. He ran *in order to catch the train*. (ibid.)

Portener (2018: 108)

• “associate [the purpose clause] *so that* [p] with a meaning like ‘because x wants and intends p’ with x bound by the matrix subject”
Evidence for “non-responsibility situation ⇔ implicit exemption from obviation”

• When a negated purpose clause conveys a RESP situation, as in (27), the PPI in definite *quelque chose* (‘something’) isn’t fully accepted, unlike a negative word *rien*.

• This indicates that an implicit reanalysis as a subjunctive clause isn’t allowed with a RESP complement.

(27) Ce nouveau musulman fait beaucoup d’efforts {pour ne rien manger / ??pour ne pas manger quelque chose} dans la journée pendant le ramadan. [??pas >quelque chose]

‘This new Muslim makes a great effort in order not to eat {anything / something} in the daytime during Ramadan.’

(The RESP flavor of the relevant situation is conveyed by the matrix predicate "faire beaucoup d’effort" in its lexical meaning)
Evidence for “narrow scope of PPI ↔ externalization of negation”

• As in (28), even when a negated purpose clause conveys a non-RESP situation (cf. *par inadvertance* ‘inadvertently’), the PPI *quelqu’un* is incompatible with an indefinite minimalizer, *(dire) un mot* ‘(say) a word’.

(28) Tout ermite qui vit dans le monastère de la Grande Chartreuse fait beaucoup attention *pour ne pas dire un mot* à {*quiconque* / ??*quelqu’un*} *par inadvertance*. ‘Every hermit who lives in the Grande Chartreuse monastery is very careful in order not to say a word to {anyone / someone} inadvertently.’

• This incompatibility is naturally accounted for by assuming that the minimalizer requires a clause-internal interpretation of the negation, while the narrowly interpreted PPI needs an external negation.
Japanese’s auxiliary -TE SHIMAU is ambiguous depending on the semantics of the preceding predicate (cf. Sugimoto 1991).

i) It conveys the completion of an action with an intentional predicate.

(29) ronbun-o kai-te shimat-ta.
    paper-ACC write-TE SHIMAU-PST
    ‘I finished writing a paper.’

ii) I expresses the realization of an unexpected situation with a non-intentional predicate.

(30) kaze-o hii-te shimat-ta.
    cold-ACC catch-TE SHIMAU-PST
    ‘It happened that I caught a cold.’

iii) It may amount to backgrounding the intentionality (a priori induced by a predicate), suggesting that the realization of the situation is due to another factor (Isshiki 2011: 221)

(31) siken-ni ukat-te shimat-ta.
    exam-DAT pass-TE SHIMAU-PST
    ‘It happened (by good luck) that I passed the exam.’
Positive imperatives

- An imperative with $<\text{non-intentional predicate}+-\text{TE SHIMAU}>$ should be interpreted as a wish as regards the hearer’s situation, as in (9b) (cf. Yoshikawa 1974: 72; Hayatsu 2014: 18).

(32)a. kaeru-o tabe-te simae!
frog-ACC eat-TE SHIMAU-IMP(ERATIVE)
‘Finish eating that frog’ (Title of Japanese translation of *Eat That Frog!: 21 Great Ways to Stop Procrastinating and Get More Done in Less Time*)

b. korona-ni kakat-te simae! (google)
corona.virus-DAT eat-TE SHIMAU-IMP
‘(I wish) For it to happen that you catch the covid-19!’
Negative imperatives

(33) a.  ??konoryoori-o  tabe-te shimau-na.  [intentional predicate]
       this  dish-ACC  eat-TE SHIMAU-NEG.IMP

   ‘Don’t finish eating this dish! (even if you start to eat it)’

b.  korona-ni  kakat-te shima-na.  [non-intentional predicate]
    corona.virus-DAT  eat-TE SHIMAU-NEG.IMP

   ‘For it not happen that you catch the covid-19!
   (Take care for it not to be the case that you catch the covid-19!)’

c.  otona-ni  nat-te shimau-na-yo  [non-intentional predicate]
    adult-DAT  become-TE SHIMAU-NEG.IMP-I tell you

   ‘For it not happen that you become an adult
   (Take care for it not to be the case that you become an adult’
   [title of a pop song by Japanese rock group, Six Lounge]
Negated purpose clauses

- In a negated purpose clause (34a), which is naturally translated by (10b), *dare-ka* (‘someone’) is out-scoped by a clause-mate negation, just as in the French (25).

(34)a. *dare-ka-o kizutsuke-te shimawa-nai yooni.*
    someone-ACC hurt-TE SHIMAU-NEG in order to
    https://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/prg/prg18429.html

b. ‘in order for it *not* happen that I hurt someone’
A PPI in the negative imperative in (35) can be out-scoped by the clause-mate negation since (35a) is semantically reanalyzed, in terms of implicit exemption from obviation, as (35b), which is represented by (35c).

(35)a. Do not (inadvertently) question somebody's immigration status. (= (1))
   b. Take care for it not to be the case [that you question somebody's immigration status].
   c. \[\lambda x. \text{TAKE CARE } [\neg \exists p \ [p = \lambda w' (\exists y. \text{you question } y\text{'s immigration status in } w')] ] \in \text{To-Do-List(you)}\]

The analysis in terms of implicit exemption from obviation is supported by:

i) explicit and implicit exemption from obviation and licensing of PPIs in French purpose clauses, and;

ii) Japanese auxiliary –TE SHIMAU, which is ambiguous between a completion meaning (with an intentional predicate) and an advertently-reading (with a non-intentional predicate)
• Goncharov, J. 2018. Intentionality Effect in Imperatives. *Proceedings of FASL 27*